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RONALD J. BACIGAL

Implied Hearsay
LAWYERS sometimes exagerate the significance of
a single sentence or footnote in a court opinion.' At
other times a single phrase may turn out to be a time
bomb which subsequently explodes with far reaching
result:i. Court watr.hers thus spend considerable time
trymg to discer:ii what is implied within the literal
language of a court's opinion. It is no small irony that
one of the latest implications in a Virginia Supreme
Court decision relates to the implications contained
within an out-of-court statement that cannot be literally defined as hearsay. A modification of the hearsay
rule, or at least the hearsay rule applicable to child
molestation cases, may be contained within a single
paragraph of the Virginia Supreme Court's opinion in
Church v. Commonwealth. 2
In Church the defendant was charged with sexual
offenses against a seven year old girl. The victim did
not appear at trial, but the victim's mother testified
that the child became preoccupied with sex and told
her mother that sex was "dirty, nasty, and it hurt."
Defense counsel's hearsay objection to this statement
was overruled. In its review of the case, the Virginia
Supreme Court applied the classic definitions of hearsay and non-hearsay.
HEARSAY-extra-judicial statements "offered for a special purpose, namely, as assertions to evidence the truth of the matter
asserted. ":1
NON-HEARSAY-out-of-court statements not
offered to show their truth are not subject to
the rule against hearsay, and are thus admissible ifrelevant.~
The Court noted that the Commonwealth did not
offer the child's statement to prove the literal contents
of the assertion that sex is "dirty, nasty, and it hurt."
Rather the statement showed the child's attitude
toward sex, "an attitude likely to have been created
by a traumatic experience.... Thus, the child's out-ofcourt statement was not hearsay, but was admissible
as circumstantial evidence tending to establish the
probability of a fact in issue." 5 1.e. the corpus delicti of
a sexual offense. 6 The Court's brief analysis correctly
applied the literal definition of hearsay to the literal
contents of the statement, but the Court did not
address the more subtle aspects of applying the hear16

say rule to assertions implied within the literal contents of a statement.
Implied assertions focus, not on the literal contents
of a statement, but upon the message impliedly contained within such statements. Certain implied assertions are so obvious that common sense dictates that
they be recognized as hearsay. For example: A potential buyer asks: "Is this pure heroin?" Tu which the
declarant responds: "Do cops wear blue?" Counsel
offering this statement may contend that it is not
hearsay because it is not offered for the truth of the
literal statement that police wear blue. The mere
uttering of such words is seen as an objective fact
from which the jury may or may not infer something
other than the truth of the matter asserted. E.g. infer
that the hroin is pure. Although the inference is
rather ob,ious, this does not convert the inference
into an asf,ertion by the declarant. Under this analysis, if the ,iury is not asked to accept the literal truth of
the matt.er asserted, then the statement cannot be
classifir;d as hearsay.
Such superficial analysis is not convincing because
counsel, judge, and jury will recognize the clear message contained between the lines of the declarant's
colorful language. Common sense dictates treating
such statements as hearsay. Unfortunately, implied
assertions also come in much subtler forms than the
above hypothetical. In many situations it is difficult
to determine when it is appropriate to take the declarant literally, and when it is necessary to "read
between the lines" in order to decipher what the
declarant "really" meant.
Consider the following hypothetical: 7 The defense
offers the statement of the alleged homicide victim
who hugged the defendant and said: "I love you."
Defense counsel may argue that such a statement is
not hearsay because it is not offered for the truth of
the literal contents of the statement. (Love being
irrelevant to a homicide prosecution) Counsel will
maintain that the mere uttering of the words (and the
hug) 8 is an objective fact and is thus circumstantial
evidence from which the jury may or may not draw
inferences. E.g., if a victim would not love her assr.ilant, then it can be inferred that the defendant is not
the assailant. Defense counsel will point out that the

prosecution is free to argue possible counter inferences. E.g., the expression of love may have been an act
of forgiveness and thus does not disprove the attack.
Under the defense analysis the jury is not considering
hearsay, but is dischar[ring its traditional function
when considering circumstantial evidence. I.e., the
jury must choose between competing rational inferences.
The prosecution, however, may not accept a characterization of the "I love you" statement as nonhearsay. The prosecution may argue that the inference to be drawn by the jury is the very message
contained between the lines of the declarant's literal
statement. Thus the defense is seen to introduce an
out-of-court statement that the defendant is not the
assailant, offered to prove that the defendant is not
the assailant. The difficult question for the judge is
whether the assertion implied within the statement is
hearsay, or whether the implication is merely a permissible inference to be accepted or rejected by the
jury.
Applying the above considerations to the Church
case, the Virginia Supreme Court did not address the
assertion impliedly contained within the child's statement that sex was "dirty, nasty, and it hurt." What
was the child trying to communicate to the Mother? If
the child was "really" saying I think sex is nasty
because I have had a traumatic sexual experience,
then this is the very purpose for which the statement
was admitted. The jury was asked to accept the truth
of the child's out-of-court statement that she had had
a traumatic sexual experience. When the statement is
offered for the truth of the implied assertion the
statement must be classified as hearsay.
If the child's statement is not offered for the truth of
the implied assertion, then the mere uttering of the
statement must somehow be probative of an operative
issue. From the uttering of the statement the court
inferred the child's "attitude toward sex,"!• and from
the existence of that attitude the court inferred the
existence of a factual basis for the attitude (i.e., the
occurance of the sexual act). 10 Stringing these inferences together is a round-about way of reaching the
same point reached by the concept of implied assertions. Under either analysis the child's statement is
relevant only if the statement is accepted as evidence
that a sexual act occurred. Hearsay analysis would
regard the statement as direct evidence of the act,
while non-hearsay analysis would regard the statement as circumstantial evidence of the act. This
somewhat artifical distinction between direct and circumstantial evidence should not determine the evidence's admissibility. Yet that is precisely the result
reached in Church. Had the statement been classified
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as hearsay, the statement would ~10t be admitted in
the absence of cross-examination to test the child's
sincerity, memory, narration, and perception of the
alleged sexual ad.
The failure to permit cross-examination of the
declarant lies at the heart of the hearsay rule, but the
dangers of denying cross-examination are also present in Church's characterization of the statement as
non-hearsay. If the child were on the witness stand
the child could be asked: Why do you think sex is
nasty? The possible answers include: (1) because such
and such (the traumatic sexual experience) occurred;
(2) because one of my friends said so; or (3) because I
peeked in the bedroom and saw Mommy and Daddy
doing nasty things to each other. These quite different
answers demonstrate that it is not the child's attitude
toward sex that is relevant. Rather, it is the factual
basis of that attitude which may or may not be rele17

vant. The factual basis of that attitude cannot be
developed when cross-examination is denied. Crossexamination is needed to test the child's sincerity,
memory, narration, and perception of the factual
situation which allegedly caused the child's attitude
toward sex. The child's statement should be classifed
as hearsay in order to protect the fundamental right
of cross-examination.
If a superficial formulation of the hearsay rule is
mechanically applied, the rule may lead to the result
in the Church case. If, however, the purpose of the
hearsay rule (protection of the right of cross-examination) is given proper consideration, then the result
in Church is difficult to defend in terms of Evidence
Law. There are of course many legitimate interests in
seeking to protect a victimized child from enduring
the additional trauma of vigorous cross-examination. 11
Such policy considerations may justify the result
reached in Church. But the decision in Church is not
openly based on a legitimate concern for the child.
The decision is phrased wholly in terms of a general
application of the hearsay rule.
It is unfortunate that the Court did not utilize the
Church case to clarify the Virginia position on
implied assertions. The policy considerations in
Church make it difficult to ascertain whether the
decision was merely a hard case which led the Court
to modify the hearsay rule in order to protect a young
child, or whether the analysis in Church forbodes a
relaxation in the general prohibition against the
admission of hearsay evidence. 12
FOOTNOTES

1. The famous footnote 4 of United States v. Caroline Products Cu., ;304 U.S. 144 (1938) has produced volumes of analysis.
2. V.L.R. (1985).
3. Church at (original emphasis).
4. Church at.
5. Church at.
fi. The corpus delicti relates to the body of the crime regardless of the identity of the perpetrator. Thus the child's statement
is evidence that the crime occurred, but the statement itself does
not link the defendant to the crime.
7. This hypothetical is suggested in Broun and Meisenholder, Problems in Evidence 97 (West 2nd ed.). The Virginia
Supreme Court is not alone in classifying such situations as
non-hearsay. See, e.g., RridRes v. State, 247 Wis. :!50, 19 N.W.2d
fi29 (194fi).
8. Assertions may be contained within conduct as well as
within words. The hug may simply be another way of saying "I
love you." The Federal Rules of Evidence provide that nonver-
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bal conduct is a statement for purposes of hearsay only when
the person intends the conduct as an assertion. Fed. R. Evidence
801 (a).
9. If the statement merely establishes the child's state of
mind, it is academic whether the statement is classified as nonhearsay or falls within the State of Mind exception to the hearsay rule. See United States v. Southland Corp., 7b0 F.2d 1366
(2nd Cir. 1985). (An outright assertion of one's existing state of
mind is a hearsay exception. A statement which provides the
basis for drawing a circumstantial inference as to the declarant's state of mind is non-hearsay.) Whether the child's statement is labelled non-hearsay state of mind or the state of mind
exception to the hearsay rule, the inferences to be drawn from
that state of mind remain the same. See footnote 10.
10. The inferences to be drawn from the child's statement
would not have changed if the Court had invoked the state of
mind exception to the hearsay rule. State of mind is admissible
direct evidence whenever the declarant's state of mind is an
operative issue of the case. 1'his is not applicable in Church
because mental distress is not an element of the offense
charged. State of mind is also admissible as circumstantial evidence when the state of mind supports inferences which are
probative of an operative issue. The child's state of mind
(whether it be labelled non-hearsay or a hearsay exception) is
probative of the corpus delicti only if the court accepts the
underlying premise that every state of mind inherently has an
accurate basis in fact. With no independent evidence of the factual foundation, can the mere existence of a state of mind support the inference that there is a factual basis for that state of
mind? The answer must be no, because an affirmative answer
produces ludicrous results. I.e., an in-court expression of state of
mind must be based on an adequate foundation and must be
subject to cross-examination, while an out-of-court expression of
state of mind would not have to meet these requirements. The
Court would thus reach the anomalous result that the requirements for admitting out-of-court statements are less stringent
than the requirements for in-court testimony.
1L See generally, Note, A Comprehensive Approach to Child
Hearsay Statements in Sex Abuse Cases, 8:3 Columbia L. Rev.
1745 (1983).
12. Would the Court apply the Church analysis to hearsay
questions not involving a young victim of a sexual offense? For
example: The declarant made an out-of-court statement that
"the traffic light was green." The statement is not offered to
prove the literal truth that the light was green. Rather, the
statement is offered to establish the declarant's "attitude" (state
of mind) regarding the light. It can then be inferred that this
attitude must have been based on some experience, i.e., viewing
the traffic light. Therefore, the statement is admissible to establish the "probability" that there was an operating light at the
intersection. If the operation of thr light is a material issue
because of a party's contention that the light was inoperative,
then the declarant's statement is circumstantial evidence that
the light was in working order. This hypothetical use of "nonhearsay" presents the same dangers inherent in the denial of
cross-examination. E.g., if the declnrant were on the witness
stand and asked why he though the light was green, his answer
might be: ( 1) because I saw it; (2) because .mmeone told me; or (3)
because green is my favorite color.

